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Achieving the Proper Remedy for a Dissenting
Shareholder in Today's Economy: Yuspeh v. Koch
INTRODUCTION

Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131 provides rights to a
shareholder dissenting from certain corporate actions including
mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, and sales ofassets to which
the corporation is a party. These rights, known as dissenters' or
appraisal rights, give the dissenting shareholder the right to demand
payment from the corporate issuer of his shares at their "fair cash
value."' Since the general rule in Louisiana is that corporations have
no responsibility to repurchase the shares of an investor who wishes
to recede from the firm, intuition tells one that dissenters' rights are
therefore valuable assets to all dissenting shareholders. 2 However,
these appraisal rights may provide inadequate compensation to the
shareholders who are being forced or "freezed-out" ofa corporation.
Freeze-out mergers, which began to arise in the early 1970s, are
corporate transactions in which the majority expels the minority
stockholders from the company and requires them to accept cash,
notes, or other property for their shares.4 The question has been
raised whether the dissenting shareholders of a corporate action are
limited to the rights dictated by Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131,
or instead, may they pursue other legal remedies?5 Though
unresolved in Louisiana before Yuspeh v. Koch,6 other states have
held, both jurisprudentially and statutorily, that dissenting
shareholders can maintain a breach offiduciary duty suit in lieu ofthe
statutory dissenters' rights action.7
This casenote analyzes the decision of Yuspeh v. Koch in which
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal declared, first, that
Louisiana's dissenters' rights were not exclusive and, second, that a
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. La. R.S. 12:131(C)(2) (2004).
2. Wendell H. Holmes & Glenn G. Morris, Business Organizations § 38, in
8 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise 296 (1999).
3. Id.at 324.
4. See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, andMajority Rule: Appraisal's
Role in CorporateLaw, 84 Geo. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1995).
5. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 47,
writ denied,847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
6. See Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539 (La. 1983) (The Court ruled a
dissenting shareholder can bring a breach offiduciary duty claim, but there was no
explicit discussion of "exclusivity.").
7. See, e.g., Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del.
Supr. 1985); 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11.65(a)(b) (West 1985); Perl. v. IU Int'l
Corp., 607 P.2d 1036 (Haw. 1980); Roussel v. Payne, 352 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1977); Victor Broadcasting Co. v. Mahurin, 365 S.W.2d 265 (Ark. 1963).
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minority shareholder's interests were properly valued as a
proportionate part of the corporation. The court's decision allowed
the dissenting shareholders to receive equitable monetary recovery for
their shares of stock and demonstrated that Louisiana courts
understand the serious inequities of dissenters' rights in freeze-out
transactions. The court did not hold that freeze-out transactions are
necessarily an evil way of doing business. In fact, the court supports
freeze-out transactions as long as the minority shareholders receive
a fair and evenhanded valuation for their shares of stock.
Part I of this casenote explains the factual and procedural
background of the Yuspeh case and details the court opinion. Part II
describes the pertinent history of dissenters' rights in American
corporate law, in order to ascertain the original purposes of the
statute. This description also explains how the dissenters' rights
statute is now being used for purposes that it was never designed to
accomplish.8 This second section includes a description of the two
main problems with dissenters' rights today: complicated and
demanding procedural rules, and share valuation problems that
undervalue the dissenters' shares. These particular troubles have led
many courts, including the court in Yuspeh, to allow minority
shareholders to pursue other causes of action outside dissenters'
rights.
Part III outlines: (A) why dissenters' rights should not be the
exclusive remedy with freeze-out mergers; (B) Delaware's approach
to the issue ofexclusivity of dissenters' rights; and (C) that Louisiana
followed the correct approach with the Yuspeh decision. This section
establishes that dissenters' rights are incapable of providing an
equitable remedy to a minority shareholder. Therefore, it is
nonsensical to relegate these former shareholders to this ill-equipped
remedy. Part IV describes the court's valuation ofan exiting minority
shareholder in a freeze-out transaction as a proportionate part of the
whole company. This valuation methodology was a break from the
9 but remains
precedent set in Shopf v. MarinaDel Ray Partnership,
the correct decision. However, the court made certain assumptions
that allowed it to avoid discussing this adverse precedent. Though
the decision to avoid precedent provided a correct result for the
plaintiffs in Yuspeh, it has left the jurisprudence muddled. Finally,
part V argues that Louisiana should amend its current dissenters'
rights statute to deal with the problems that freeze-out mergers have
caused under the present structure of the appraisal remedy. This
amendment can be properly achieved by following the American Law
8. Thompson, supranote 4, at 5.
9. 549 So. 2d 833 (La. 1989) (ruling that a minority's interest in the
corporation was of less value to third persons and, as a result, should be
discounted).
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Institute's guidance. Specifically the American Law Institute (AL)
recommends removing minority and marketability discounts when
shares are being sold between shareholders in a closely-held
corporation,' 0 simplifying the complicated appraisal remedy
procedures," and specifying exactly when dissenters' rights should
be applied exclusively.'
I. YUSPEH V. KOCH

A. FactualandProceduralBackground
Charles Yuspeh, Wallace Murphy, and Michael Ditcharo founded
Certified Security Systems, Incorporated (CSS) in 1983 'C Yuspeh
effectively owned seventy percent ofthe common stock ofCS S. " Of
this ownership percentage, eighteen percent represented the shares of
stock that were held in his two daughters' names.' 5 Murphy owned
exactly twenty-five percent of CSS and Ditcharo owned the
remaining five percent interest.' 6 In 1990, Yuspeh attracted two new
investors, Hansen and David Koch, to invest $1.5 million in secured
notes and $500,000 in 500 shares of preferred stock in CSS.
Eventually in 1993, the Kochs' loan to CSS became overdue. The
loan was subsequently restructured, through which the Kochs lent
additional money to CSS and the 500 shares ofpreferred stock were
exchanged for new common shares worth fifty-one percent of CSS's
issued and outstanding common stock.' 7 Consequently, the Kochs
began to control the corporation by a majority vote. This transaction
left Yuspeh, Murphy, and Ditcharo with 34.3%, 12.25%, and 2.5%
ownership interests respectively. Also, the shareholders of CSS
amended the articles of incorporation to require a 60% vote of the
shareholders to reorganize the company.' 8 The corporate articles had
previously required 67% of the shareholders to agree to
reorganization.
CSS struggled with profitability, upsetting the Kochs, the new
majority owners. In 1994, Hansen Koch fired the president, Yuspeh,
10. 2 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis
and Recommendations, §§ 7.01-7.25,at 314-15 (1994) [hereinafter American Law
Institute].
11. Id. at 335-37.
12. Id. at 347-48.
13. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 44,
writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
14.

Id.

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45.
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for falsifying the corporation's true financial condition and
subsequently promoted himself as the President and Chief Operation
Officer of CSS. Murphy, head of the sales department, eventually
quit CSS in 1996 because he was dissatisfied with his employment
terms. 19
The Kochs later attempted to purchase Murphy's new 12.5%
ownership of common stock for $50,000, which Murphy declined to
accept.20 Subsequently, in December of 1997 the Kochs, who now
controlled the corporation with a majority ownership interest, caused
the board of directors to issue them thirty-four authorized, but
previously unissued shares of common stock from CSS for $50 per
share.21 The plaintiffs, consisting of Yuspeh and other minority
shareholders, were never notified of the Kochs purchase of these
thirty-four shares of stock. This transaction raised the Kochs
ownership percentage to approximately 67.6%, giving them the sixty
percent ownership interest necessary to reorganize CSS.
The Kochs reorganized, over objections by Yuspeh and the other
minority shareholders, and created a new corporation wholly owned
by them. The Kochs merged CSS into this new company, leaving
them with a 100% ownership interest in the new firm, and requiring
Yuspeh and the other minority shareholders to relinquish their CSS
shares for $50 a share. 2
The plaintiffs believed that the merger did not set their stock at
fair market value. The $50 per share price set by the plan of merger
was much lower than the $2000 per share value the Kochs had earlier
offered Murphy for his 12.25% ownership interest. The plaintiffs
would have been entitled to exercise appraisal rights, had they
complied with the statutorily prescribed procedures.2 Instead, they
filed a suit alleging that the majority shareholders committed fraud
and a breach of fiduciary duty by purchasing the thirty-four unissued
shares and abusing the leverage those thirty-four shares gave them by
forcing the minority shareholders out of the corporation in a
freeze-out merger.24
The district court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana entered a verdict
in favor of the minority shareholders, and the defendants appealed to
the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.2

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
See infra text accompanying notes 67-74.
Yuspeh, 840 So. 2d at 43.
Id. at 44.
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B. Summary of the Defendants'Arguments
The defendants, Hansen and David Koch, argued two assignments
of error worthy of discussion. First, the defendants argued that the
trial court erred in failing to treat the statutory dissenters' rights as the
plaintiffs' sole remedy, which the plaintiffs had lost by their failure
to comply with the statutory procedures required by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 12:13 1.26 Second, the Kochs contended that the trial
court had erred in recognizing causes ofaction for fraud and a breach
of fiduciary duty based on the issuance of the thirty-four new shares
without notice to the minority shareholders and on the subsequent
merger.27
C. Summary of the LouisianaCourtofAppeal's Decision
i. Argument that the Trial CourtFailedto Rule thatLouisiana
Revised Statutes 12:131w as the Minority Shareholders' Sole
Remedy
In the court's view, the facts of Yuspeh squarely posed the
following question: are dissenting shareholders of a corporation
allowed to bring actions against the company outside of the
dissenters' right statute, or are the shareholders exclusively limited to
the statutory dissenters' remedy?28 The court answered this question
by noting that there was nothing in the text of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 12:131, or even prior jurisprudence, which stated that this
statute is a minority shareholder's sole remedy for attempting to
receive a "fair value" for his shares.29 Moreover, the judges
recognized that the statute was completely silent on fraud or breach
offiduciary duty claims. As such, the court declared that the minority
shareholders were not exclusively limited to the dissenters' rights
described in Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131 30
ii. Argument ofNo Cause ofAction for Fraudor Breach of
FiduciaryDuty
In determining the strength of the no cause of action argument,
the court used Black's Law Dictionary to define a fiduciary as "a
person having duty [sic], created by his undertaking, to act primarily
for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking. A
26. Id.at 46.
27. Id.

28. Id.at 47.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.(citing Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539 (La. 1983)).
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term [sic] to refer to a person having duties involving good faith,
trust, special confidence, and candor towards another."' The court
then cited Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:91, which states that officers
and directors of a company are presumed to stand in a fiduciary
relation to the shareholders of the corporation. This provision
requires corporate officers and directors to perform their obligations
to the corporation in "good faith," and with the same "diligence, care,
judgment, and skill" that a reasonable person would perform them.32
The court compared the Kochs' secretive purchase of the thirtyfour shares for $50 per share to these requirements.33 The court noted
that only months before the Kochs had offered Murphy approximately
$2,000 per share to buy out his ownership.34 The judges concluded
that the sole purpose of the issuance of the shares was simply to
obtain the adequate voting percentage to allow the majority
shareholders to perform the freeze-out merger and force the minority
shareholders out of the corporation. This determination led the court
to ultimately conclude that the Kochs committed fraud and breached
their fiduciary duty to the corporation by purchasing the thirty-four
shares of stock without notice to the minority shareholders.35
iii. The Court ofAppeal's Determinationofthe Value of the
Stock
After the court concluded that a dissenting minority shareholder
is not exclusively limited to the statutory remedies provided in
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131, it nevertheless looked to that
statute for guidance in determining the proper valuation of the
minority shares. In subsection (c)(2) the statute states that this
determination is based on "fair cash values" of the minority
shareholders' shares the day before the merger vote is taken. Because
the freeze-out merger proposal was decided on December 30, 1997,
the evaluation date for fair cash value was December 29, 1997.
The court considered various expert witnesses to determine fair
cash value. After reviewing all of the valuation methods, the court
concluded that the jury erred in its valuation of CSS's stock.36 The
court ruled that recurring monthly revenues (RMR) is the "initial
cornerstone" in determining CSS's value.37 The court found RMRto
be $120,000, and multiplied this amount by forty-six, which was the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.at 49-50.
Id. at 50 (citing La. R.S. 12:91).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 53.
Id.
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most consistently recited multiplier elicited from various expert
witnesses.3" This initially set CSS's total assets value at $5.4 million.
After adding back certain receivables and subtracting debts,
$783,300 remained to be divided up among the shareholders
according to investment percentages before the Kochs' secretive
purchase of the thirty-four shares.
Therefore, Yuspeh and his daughters received $268,750 (for their
34.3% ownership), and Murphy received $96,033 (for his 12.26%
ownership). 4' This resulted in an award ofapproximately $3,840 per
share, which was well above both the $2,000 per share4 offer made
by the Kochs to purchase Murphy's shares just months earlier and the
$50 per share42 given to the minority shareholders in the freeze-out
merger. Now that an understanding of the Yuspeh decision has been
attained, it is necessary to delve into the pertinent history of
dissenters' rights. The next section demonstrates that dissenters'
rights were never designed for "freeze-out" mergers.43 As a result,
dissenters' rights can be an inadequate remedy for a dissenting
shareholder and should not treated as the shareholder's sole remedy
when being forced out of the corporation in a freeze-out transaction.
II. PERTINENT HISTORY OF DISSENTERS' RIGHTS

Until the late nineteenth century, American corporate law
declared that shareholder consent was a fundamental prerequisite for
a company to engage in a merger." The principle behind this concept
was that since every shareholder possessed a property right in the
corporation, they should not be required to exchange this asset for a
property right in a different merged company.4 This approach
allowed minority shareholders to block corporate actions that were

38. Id.at 52-53. The court used the market value method to value CSS, which
figures a gross sales price by multiplying the RMR by a multiple. Id.
39. Id. at 54.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 45-46.
43. Thompson, supranote 4, at 4.
44. Michael G. Schinner, Dissenting Shareholder'sStatutory Right to Fair
Cash Value: Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 22 Akron L. Rev. 261, 265 (1989)
(citing Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 781-82 (1987)).
45. Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Jr., Is a Fistful ofDollarsthe Answer?
A Critical Look at Dissenters' Rights Under the Revised Model Business
CorporationAct, 12 J.L. & Com. 211,212 (1993) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Recent Developments: CorporateFusion by Sale ofAssets andDissolutionHeld
Free From Delaware Statutory Right of Appraisal Despite Claims of DeFacto
Merger,63 Colum. L. Rev. 1135 (1963)).
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considered beneficial by the majority shareholders.46 In a large
corporation, with thousands or millions of shareholders, shareholder
consents of this kind were impossible to obtain.
Legislatures, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, concluded that one
shareholder should not be able to veto important corporate actions
(e.g., mergers) desired by a majority of shareholders. As a result,
Congress began giving broader powers to majority shareholders to
perform corporate transactions, even over a minority objection.4
In exchange for this broadened power given to the majority,
dissenters were given the right to receive fair cash value for their
ownership interests, and judicial appraisal was mandated where the
fair cash value of the stock was in dispute.48 This new compromise
was designed to balance the majority interest in proceeding with
corporate transactions against the interests of the minority
shareholders, who needed a way to ensure that they could safely exit
a corporation that was making a transactional decision with which
they did not agree.49
In sum, the dissenters' rights statutory remedy was created to give
dissenting shareholders liquidity for their shares of stock while
facilitating desirable corporate transactions. 50 In Louisiana, a
dissenters' rights statute (currently Louisiana Revised Statutes
12:131) was put into effect on July 18, 1928. Today, the liquidity
purpose ofthe dissenters' rights statute is almost completely obsolete
in large publicly traded corporations. There are now large securities
markets that give dissatisfied corporate investors an easy opportunity'
to liquidate their corporate stock in arms-length transactions. 1
However, the liquidity purpose is still prevalent for dissenting
shareholders in closely held corporations,5 especially in states such
as Louisiana where most corporations are not publicly traded.
When dissenters' rights were created they were intended for what
are termed "freeze-in" mergers. Freeze-in mergers occur when all
shareholders at the time of a transaction are treated equally and
receive a corresponding ownership interest in the new corporate

46. Id.(citing F. Hodge O'Neal & Robert B. Thompson, O'Neal's Oppression
of Minority Shareholders § 5.03 (2d ed. 1991)).
47. Id. at213.
48. Id. (citing Irving J. Levy, Rights of DissentingShareholdersto Appraisal
andPayment, 15 Cornell L.Q. 420, 421 (1930)).
49. Id.; Schinner, supranote 44, at 265-66.
50. Thompson, supranote 4, at 3-4.
51. Dissenters' rights are not even generally available under Louisiana law for
shareholders of publicly-traded corporations. See La. R.S. 12:131 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d
41, 47, writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
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formation.53 They are called freeze-in mergers because under the
plan the shareholders are required to accept stock in the new merged
entity regardless of whether they would prefer to exit the newly
merged corporation by selling their shares. In the 1970s a new form
of corporate transaction phenomenon developed with the advent of
"freeze-out" mergers.54 Freeze-out mergers, on the other hand, are
corporate transactions in which the majority kicks the minority
stockholders out of the company and reuires them to accept cash,
notes, or other property for their shares. ' The vast majority of the
dissenters' rights asserted today result from freeze-out transactions.
As dissenters' rights were designed for freeze-in transactions,
they were planned to be used to protect a minority shareholder from
being forced to stay in a merged corporation when that shareholder
really wanted out. The appraisal remedy was not designed for a
freeze-out transaction, in which the statutory remedy would be used
to protect a minority shareholder who wanted to stay with the
corporation from being forced out of the company. 5 The big
difference is that in a freeze-in merger the same deal is proposed for
all shareholders. Therefore, there is no self-dealing by the majority
because every shareholder is treated equally.
On the other hand, in a freeze-out merger there is a large conflict
of interest between the majority, who will stay in the new
corporation, and the minority, who will be forced to exit the
corporation by selling their shares of stock. The majority will want
to buy out the minority shareholders at the lowest possible price.
Consequently, in these freeze-out scenarios the appraisal remedy's
purpose has been altered to regulating what amounts to be a
partition of co-owned property (e.g., the shares of stock). This new
purpose is to "serve as a check against opportunism by a majority
shareholder in [freeze-out] transactions."5 While there have been
few Louisiana cases discussing this issue, the 1983 Delaware
Supreme Court's opinion in Weinberger v. UOP,Inc. depicts how
that Court tried to reform the Delaware appraisal rights to take
account of their new role regarding freeze-out transactions. 58
Judging from the later decision ofRabkin v. PhillipA. Hunt Corp., 9
this reform was not viewed as entirely successful. Even after
53. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 324.
54. Id.at 309.
55. Id.at 324.

56. See id.

57. Thompson, supranote 4, at 4 ("[L]ess than one in ten ofthe litigated cases
illustrate the liquidity/fundamental change concern of the classic appraisal
remedy.").
58. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
59. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
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reform, dissenters' rights were not exclusive, and they remain so in
the state of Delaware.
In essence, in Louisiana and all over the country, dissenters' rights
statutes are now being used for purposes that they were never
designed to accomplish.6 ° Not surprisingly, there are now serious
concerns with the application of this statutory remedy. The court in
Yuspeh v. Koch does not speak explicitly about any ofthis history or
the concerns now present in Louisiana's appraisal statute. However,
one must fully understand this information before one can
comprehend what most likely led the court to its conclusion. The
following sections illustrate why dissenters' rights are no longer an
effective remedy for a dissenting shareholder. The first section
describes how the required dissenters' rights procedures may cause
a dissenter to lose those rights rather easily.61 The succeeding section
discusses how there are unfavorable share valuation problems that
arise when the dissenting shareholders receive "fair cash value."62
A. Cumbersome ProceduralRules that Can Take away Dissenters'
Rights
There are numerous procedures that a dissenting shareholder must
accurately and precisely follow in order to properly assert their
dissenters' rights. Failure to comply creates the risk of losing the
statutory remedy altogether. In Louisiana, Louisiana Revised Statutes
12:131 contemplates that eight detailed steps must be followed
exactly before the rights will be recognized.63
The following rules are general and can differ depending on the
type of merger. First, the corporation must give its shareholders
notice of the meeting in which shareholder approval will be obtained
for a corporate transaction.65 Second, the dissenting shareholder must
file a written objection of the corporate transaction with the
company.66 Third, the dissenter must actually vote against the
proposed transaction when it is submitted for vote.67 Fourth, the
60. Thompson, supra note 4, at 5 ("The appraisal remedy remains caught
between one function that is no longer needed and another that it is inadequately
equipped to perform.").
61. See Holmes & Morris, supra note 2, at 315-23 (describing eight specific
procedures that a dissenting shareholder must follow).
62. Id.at 327-34.
63. Id. at 315-23.
64. See, e.g., La. R.S. 12:112(G) (2004) (short form mergers require different
procedures).
65. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 315 (simplifying the procedures listed
in La. R.S. 12:131).
66. Id. at 316.
67. Id
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transaction must receive the required affirmative vote of the
Fifth, after the transaction is completed, the
shareholders.6"
corporation must send "prompt" notice to the dissenting
shareholders. 69 Sixth, within "twenty days" of the mailing of the
merger notice, the dissenting shareholder must (1) escrow their stock
certificates in a bank that is in the same location of the parish where
the corporation's registered office is located, and (2) make written
demand for the payment of the escrowed shares. 70 Seventh, the
corporation must reply to the dissenting shareholder's demand within
twenty days ofreceiving it or pay the value demanded by the minority
shareholder. 7' Finally, if the corporation disagrees as to the amount
of payment, as is usually the case, then the shareholder must file a
valuation suit within "sixty days" of the date he received the
corporation's reply in step seven.72 Only after this process is
complete will the court determine the proper amount that the
corporation is required to pay for the shares of stock. However, if the
shareholder does not file the valuation suit within sixty days, that
shareholder becomes bound by what the corp oration thought the
payment should be, which could even be zero. 7' If any of these eight
rules are violated, it is possible that the appraisal remedy will be
precluded.74
Obviously, these procedures are extremely complicated. One
slight mistake in these procedures and the statutory remedy may be
lost. One may ask, why is the law so demanding in declaring
shareholders ineligible for dissenters' rights when they make minimal
procedural errors? 75 The answer lies in the fact that appraisal
remedies were a legislatively created device that represented a
compromise between the majority and minority shareholders. The
majority wanted strict appraisal terms so that frivolous lawsuits
against beneficial corporate transactions by minority shareholders
would be deterred.76 With freeze-in transactions, these strict
procedures make sense because the minority has the option to stay
68. ld. at316-17.
69. Id.at 317-20.
70. Id. at 320-21.
71. Id. at 321-22.
72. Id. at 322-23.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., McCall v. McCall Enterprises, Inc., 578 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 708 (La. 1991). The court read the procedures
strictly and precluded the shareholders' right to dissent, stating that a shareholder
who failed to meet the twenty-day deadline (Step #6) was presumed to have
acquiesced in the transaction. Id.
75. See, e.g., Gibson v. Strong Co., 708 S.W.2d 603, 604-05 (Ark. 1986)
(appraisal remedy denied because minority objection one-half hour after the vote).
76. Thompson, supranote 4, at 40.
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with the corporation and be treated equally instead of asserting the
appraisal remedy." That is to say, the legislature obviously knew that
the exercise of the appraisal remedy would cost corporations large
amounts of cash, and so they decided to place the procedural burden
on the minority shareholders."8
However, this casenote has discussed how appraisal remedies are
no longer being used for their originally constructed purposes.
Therefore, applying these strict procedural requirements to minority
shareholders today is illogical. When the minority is being
effectively shut out ofa corporation, frivolous abuse ofthe dissenters'
rights remedy seems much less plausible. Yuspeh v. Koch does not
deal with any procedural requirements of dissenters' rights. In fact,
the plaintiffs in Yuspeh did not even assert their dissenters' rights.
However, these strict procedural requirements for a freeze-out merger
may have been one of the reasons that the plaintiffs decided to pursue
remedies outside the scope of appraisal rights. By recognizing a
separate breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court permitted the
plaintiffs to avoid these strict procedural requirements.
B. UnfavorableShare Valuation Problemswith Dissenter'sRights
Before discussing why dissenters' rights provide unfavorable
share valuation issues, it is important to recall one of the original
purposes of the statute with respect to the dissenting shareholders.
That purpose, which is still present today in closely-held corporations,
is to allow the shareholders to exit the corporation and to easily
receive money for their shares of stock.7 9 In freeze-out transactions,
dissenters' rights do give exiting shareholders money for their stock,
but at extremely unfavorable discounts.8"
Discounts are applied to the minority shareholders' stock
essentially on two major bases: (1) lack of marketability; and (2)
minority status ofthose shares. 8 The theory behind the marketability
discount is that when the corporation decides to freeze-out the
minority shareholders, there is usually no established market for the
minority to be able to sell their shares.82 This can lead to possible
risks and expenses that cause the marketability discount to be applied.
77. Id.

78. See id.
79. Johnson & Bartlett, supranote 45, at 213.
80. See Shopf v. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989) ("A
minority interest may be uniquely valuable to the owner, but may have considerably
less value to an independent third party, because the interest is relatively illiquid
and difficult to market.").
81. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 328.
82. Id.
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The proponents of the marketability discount rationalize it by arguing
that because this discount is allocated equally among all classes of
stock, it is treating all classes of stockholders equally and fairly.83
However, the commentators in the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise point
out that this idea of equality is simply an illusion.84 It is only the
minority shareholders who are trying to sell their shares of stock for
the proper price. The rest of the corporate stockholders could truly
care less what any expert declares the value oftheir stock to be at the
moment of the freeze-out merger.
Furthermore, the minority discount can be applied on top of the
marketability discount. This minority discount has been based on the
premise that the minority's stock is only representative of a
non-controlling portion of the company. Therefore, the stock's value
should be worth less than its "proportionate share" of the
corporation's fair value. Opponents of the minority discount think
it is unfair to allow the majority shareholders to effectively penalize
the minority shareholders for lack ofcontrol.86 They believe that each
shareholder should receive their proportionate share of the whole
corporation's value.87
Even if one concludes that there are logical reasons for applying
the discounts to the minority shareholders' stock, serious problems
remain for determining when and how to calculate these discounts.
In a freeze-out merger the officers and directors of the existing
corporation produce experts who testify as to why the discounts
should apply and how much the discounts should be.88 There is
absolutely no statistical basis from which to measure these experts'
calculations. Also, no expert can ever be proven wrong because in
closely-held corporations no market exists to determine the true worth
of the minority shares.89 Therefore, there is no real way to ever
accurately determine whether these discounts should be applied, and
if so, whether the discount percentage is correct. Even more
troubling is that this seemingly unclear and presumably biased system
is then protected even further after the trial court decides that the
discounts should apply. This is because the discounts have been held
to be factual questions that are reviewed under the manifest error

83. Id.at 333.
84. Id.
85. American Law Institute, supranote 10, at 324.
86. Holmes & Morris, supra note 2, at 333 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Hamett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Del. 1989)).
87. Id. at 333 (citing In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co.,
565 A.2d 997, 1005 (Me.1989)).
88. Id. at 329.
89. Id. at 328-30.
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standard. 9° Under this standard a trial court's ruling on the proper
discount can be overturned by the appellate court only if it deems the
discount clearly unreasonable. In effect, this puts too much power in
the hands of a trial court, which is questionably equipped to
accurately value minority shares.
1II. APPRAISAL RIGHTS AS AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY?

One of the most important questions when dealing with
dissenters' rights is whether the statutory rights available are the
exclusive remedy to shareholders who might wish to pursue other
shareholder claims, including a breach of fiduciary duty. Most states'
dissenters' rights statutes, including Louisiana's, simply declare what
remedies a minority shareholder possesses when dissenting from a
corporate transaction.91 A strictly literal reading of these statutes
lends support to the argument that since the appraisal remedy
declares what rights a dissenting shareholder possesses, then this legal
remedy is the minority shareholder's sole remedy. This argument has
some logic to it because most dissenters' rights statutes, including
Louisiana's, simply make no mention of exceptions for fraud or
breach of fiduciary duty.92 This strict constructionist reading
concludes that if there were supposed to be exceptions to the
dissenters' rights statutes, then the legislature would have added such
exceptions. On the other hand, one could also argue that the statutory
remedy is just one of many remedies available to a dissenting
minority shareholder. The statute does not specifically state that the
appraisal remedy is the only remedy to a dissenting shareholder, so
why should the shareholder not have the ability to pursue other causes
of action, including a breach of fiduciary duty.
The majority of states across the nation seem to be heeding the
American Law Institute's (ALl) suggestion that, until the statutory
remedy is altered to take account of freeze-out mergers, then the
courts should allow shareholders to pursue certain other causes of
action. 93 All of the problems with dissenters' rights statutes
90. E.g., McMillan v. Bank of the South, 514 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1987), writ denied, 516 So. 2d 131 (1987) (holding that the trial court had based its
determination ofthe value ofthe stock on the testimony and evidence ofexperts and
had made no manifest error).
91. See, e.g., La. R.S. 12:131 (2004).
92. See id.
93. See, e.g., American Law Institute, supra note 10, at 358-79. The
recommendations listed all fifty states' approaches to the issue of exclusivity in
1994. Only Florida ruled the statute exclusive at all times. Three other states had
exclusive statutes, but courts allowed for certain exceptions, including when a
corporation is controlled and a shareholder elects not to pursue appraisal remedy
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previously discussed, which have arisen because of the advent of
freeze-out mergers, simply make the principle ofexclusivity unfair to
minority shareholders. The Principles of Corporate Governance,
published by the American Law Institute, state "exclusivity is
justified only if(l) the procedures applicable to the appraisal remedy
minimize those barriers that now inhibit its exercise by eligible
shareholders, and (2) some limited exceptions to exclusivity are
recognized in those circumstances where conflicts of interest are most
apparent."94 In a sense, the American Law Institute, like the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act (R.M.B.C.A.), wants to make the
appraisal rights exclusive, but only if certain exceptions are allowed.
The R.M.B.C.A. provides that "[a] shareholder [entitled to dissent
and obtain payment for his shares under appraisal rights] may not
challenge a completed corporate action ... unless such corporate
action . . . was procured as a result of fraud or material
misrepresentation.95 Essentially, this rule is "exclusive unless it
shouldn't be exclusive."96 The following sections of this casenote
analyze whether applying the appraisal remedy exclusively should
vary with the type of corporate transaction involved, the significance
ofDelaware's approach to exclusivity, and Louisiana's brief history
with exclusivity, as well as Yuspeh's impact on this issue.
A. ShouldDissenters'Rights be Ruled as an Exclusive Remedy in
Both "Freeze-in"and "Freeze-out" Transactions?
Applying dissenters' rights exclusively only seems to make sense
when it is done to shareholders in a freeze-in transaction.97 In a
freeze-in transaction it is the minority shareholder's assertion ofthe
appraisal remedy that triggers the loss of shareholder rights (e.g.,
In this situation, if the
voting rights, dividend rights, etc.).
dissenters' rights are lost in any way, 9 then the dissenter is reinstated
with all of his shareholder rights and responsibilities. 0 The
shareholder either gets to receive fair cash value for his shares of
(California); when there are claims against officers based on their own conduct
(Connecticut); and when the court rules there is no valid purpose for the merger
(Indiana). Id.
94. Id. at 295.
95. Revised Model Business Corp. Act §13.02(d) (2002) [hereinafter
R.M.B.C.A.]
96. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 346.
97. See id. at 324.
98. Id. at 323.
99. See text accompanying notes 67-74 for one possible way to lose your
dissenters' rights, which includes not properly following the procedures detailed in
the dissenters' rights statute.
100. La. R.S. 12:131(H) (2004).
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stock under the appraisal remedy, or he is simply put back to his
position in the surviving corporation with similar rights as the
remaining shareholders.1 ° Under these circumstances, it is the
minority shareholder's choice to assert dissenters' rights. Hence, it
is also their choice to relinquish control of their shareholder rights,
including the right to bring a claim for fraud and a breach offiduciary
duty. Therefore, it makes sense to apply the dissenters' rights
exclusively thereby limiting the minority shareholder's right to other
remedies.
Alternatively, applying the dissenters' rights exclusively in a
freeze-out transaction does not seem as logical."02 In this situation, it
is the actual freeze-out merger, which is beyond their control, that
causes the minority shareholder to lose their corporate shareholder
rights. Accordingly, the appraisal remedy provides these shareholders
who have been ousted from the company with a judicial remedy
because they have been stripped of their shareholder rights.
However, unlike the freeze-in transaction, the dissenters' rights
ofa minority shareholder in a freeze-out transaction are not reinstated
upon losing their appraisal rights."0 3 Otherwise, the dissenter could
purposefully relinquish their dissenters' rights and become reinstated
as a corporate shareholder. It would frustrate the whole purpose of
allowing the majority shareholders to force the minority out in a
transaction. Under these circumstances, if the appraisal remedy is
applied exclusively it is highly possible that a minority shareholder
may be left with no remedy at all if he does not properly follow the
appraisal remedy procedures." This is exactly what happened in
McCall v. McCallEnterprises,Inc.10 5 In that case, the minority had
lost their dissenters' rights and their ability to bring a derivative
action because they had asserted the appraisal remedy. In a freeze-out
transaction it seems illogical and unfair to apply the appraisal remedy
exclusively. In the McCall decision, the minority shareholders
received no judicial review whatsoever of the fairness of the
freeze-out merger terms (e.g., price) that were being imposed upon
them.
As previously discussed, Yuspeh v. Koch does not apply the
dissenters' rights exclusively. 01 6 However, the court was not simply
101.

Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 324.

102. Id.
103. Id.at 325.

104. See La. R.S. 12:13 1(H) (2004); These complicated procedures were never
designed for freeze-out transactions.
105. 578 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), writdenied, 581 So. 2d 708 (La.
1991) (stating that it is possible for a dissenting shareholder to lose both his
appraisal remedy, because of non-compliance with procedures, and his

shareholder's rights).
106. See supratext accompanying note 32.
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giving the minority shareholders back full corporate shareholder
rights after those rights were lost in a freeze-out merger. The court
realized that allowing the minority shareholders to have full corporate
rights (e.g., right to dividends and voting rights) would be detrimental
to the majority interests in the corporation. Therefore, the court only
allowed the shareholders to bring the breach of fiduciary duty and
fraud claims, which are quite narrow rights compared to corporate
shareholder rights as a whole. This decision by the court in Yuspeh
seems to properly balance the majority's concern of ousting the
minority with the minority's concern of getting proper judicial
remedies for their shares of stock. Had the minority shareholders
received a proper judicial remedy with the appraisal rights, the court
in Yuspeh would have been extremely reluctant to not apply the
dissenters' right exclusively. This decision is the correct solution to
the problem of exclusivity with dissenters' rights in freeze-out
transactions and corrects the inadequacy of the McCall decision.
B. Delaware'sExclusive AppraisalRights Statute with Judicial
Exceptions
The majority of publicly traded companies in the United States
are incorporated in the state of Delaware. Consequently, that state's
approach to various corporate issues is closely watched by the rest of
the nation for guidance. Delaware's approach to exclusivity of
dissenters' rights is no exception, as legal commentators frequently
cite Delaware jurisprudence for support." 7 While the Delaware
approach to exclusivity is far from clear, the state has taken various
of exclusivity that can provide helpful direction
stances on the issue
10 8
to other states.

In 1977, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in Singerv. Magnavox
Company,allowed a breach offiduciary duty claim to proceed outside
of the state's dissenters' rights statute.' 9 Essentially, the Court
stated that in a freeze-out merger the corporation's majority
stockholders and directors were breaching their fiduciary duty to the
minority unless the freeze-out was for a "valid business purpose" and
was "entirely fair" to the minority shareholders. "0 Discussing
whether "freeze-outs" meet these conditions commentators, Victor
107. See, e.g., Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 342-46; Johnson & Bartlett,
supranote 45, at 214; Thompson, supranote 4, at 23-24, 43-49; Schinner, supra
note 44, at 267-68.
108. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 342.
109. 380 A.2d at 977 (Del. 1977) ("Defendants cannot meet their fiduciary
obligations to plaintiffs simply by relegating them to a statutory appraisal
proceeding.").
110. Id. at 976-80. See also Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 342.
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Brudney and Marvin A. Chirelstein have stated "[f]reezeouts, by
definition, are coercive: minority stockholders are bound by
majority rule to accept cash or debt in exchange for their common
shares, even though the price they receive may be less than the
value they assign to those shares."' ' However, these commentators
are quick to point out that there really is no breach of fiduciary duty
claim unless the majority proceeds in a self-dealing or other
unacceptable fashion. The Singer Court held that a freeze-out
merger, while legally authorized by statute, could nonetheless be
seen as a breach of fiduciary duty if the merger was not "entirely
fair" to the minority shareholders." 2 Therefore, the Court looked at
the true reasons for the freeze-out merger, found those reasons
unacceptable, and concluded that the minority shareholders at issue
should not be forced to deal with the problems of dissenters' rights
which have been previously discussed.
The Yuspeh decision appears to show that Louisiana has adopted
this exclusive, absent fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty, rule that
was demonstrated in Singer. Currently, Louisiana possesses no
exceptions to its dissenters' rights. However, the court in Yuspeh
noted, "[n]othing in the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes
12:131 or case law states that §12:131 is a minority shareholders'
exclusive remedy for contesting the value of his shares in a
merger."" 3
Eventually, Delaware's stance on this issue changed
dramatically with the decision of Weinberger v. UOP,
14 and then again with the ruling in Rabkin v. Philip
Incorporated,'
A. Hunt Chemical Coporation."5 In Weinberger, the Delaware
Supreme Court changed its mind on what is the correct approach to
appraisal remedies. The Court declared that the appraisal remedy
would be the dissenting shareholders sole financial remedy in a
freeze-out merger. 116 However, the Court did allow for significant
alterations to the valuation standards that allocated dissenting
shareholders value for the shares of stock." 7
Two years later, the Delaware Court overruled Weinbergerwith
the Rabkin decision."' There, the Court stated that, while appraisal
111. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts,87 Yale L.J. 1354, 1357 (1978).
112. Singer,380 A.2d 977, 976-80.
113. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 47,
writ denied,847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
114. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (holding that valuation remedies should be
liberalized, but then making the appraisal remedy exclusive).
115. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
116. Weinberger,457 A.2d at 715.
117. Id. at 714-15.
118. Rabkin, 498 A.2d 1099.
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rights were the exclusive remedy with respect to ensuring that the
minority shareholders receive a "fair price" for their shares, the
appraisal rights are not exclusive with respect to ensuring that the
minority shareholders are entirely dealt with fairly."9 "Strangely, the
Rabkin Court seems to have been saying that minority shareholders
could be injured in a cashout merger even though they were
ultimately going to get a fair price as a result of the2 0liberalized
appraisal proceedings that Weinberger had authorized.'
To sum up Delaware's approach to the issue ofexclusivity today,
the rule is exclusive, unless thejurisprudential exception promulgated
in Rabkin applies. The Rabkin exception attaches when majority
shareholders unfairly deal with the minority shareholders.
Essentially, Delaware concluded that the liberalized valuation
methodologies that were formulated in Weinberger to protect
minority interests are unsatisfactory in cases involving the majority
shareholders' unfair dealing.
C. Louisiana's History with Exclusivity
Louisiana's history with an exclusivity analysis is quite brief. It
begins in 1983 with the Louisiana Supreme Court case of Levy v.
Billeaud.2 In Levy, the Court implied that the statutory remedies
were not exclusive by using a breach of fiduciary duty theory to
overcome a procedural requirement that prevented the dissenters from
using their appraisal rights.122 Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131 (A)
provides that if 80% of the shareholders approve of the corporate
transaction, then the minority can be denied their dissenters' rights.
In Levy, over 80% of the shareholders approved of the corporate
transaction. 23 Therefore, ifthe Court ruled that the dissenters' rights
were exclusive, then the minority shareholders faced the risk of
119. Id. at 1100-07. See also Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 344 n. 18. The
plaintiffs in Rabkin claimed to not have been dealt with fairly because there was a
lack of full disclosure to the minority shareholders. 498 A.2d 1099. The acquiring

corporation had purchased the majority shareholders stock for $25 per share. Then,
the acquiring company agreed with the minority shareholders that they would pay
at least $25 per share should they acquire the remaining shares in the target
corporation within one year ofthe original purchase from the majority shareholders.
It was later revealed that the acquiring corporation had planned all along to simply
wait for longer than one year and purchase the remaining shares at a price less than
$25 per share. Id.
120. Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 344.
121. 443 So. 2d 539 (La. 1983).
122. Id.at 543.
123. Levy v. Billeaud, 424 So. 2d 1249, 1255 (noting "[i]n the present case the
corporate action was taken prior to liquidation and was approved by approximately

95% of the total voting power. Thus, no right to dissent is available unto
plaintiffs.").
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receiving no remedy. The Court decided to allow the minority
shareholders to proceed on a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
the majority.'24 However, the Court never mentioned that is was
adopting a non-exclusivity rule in Louisiana. As a result, until
Yuspeh, no one knew whether the Louisiana courts really favored
non-exclusivity, or whether the Levy Court simply wanted to find a
way in that case, for the dissenter to receive some type of remedy.
In Yuspeh, the court clearly stated that it would not limit minority
shareholders exclusively to dissenters' rights.125 Nevertheless, the
question remains whether the court was concerned that the
shareholders would receive nothing if they were not allowed to
pursue their action under the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Under
12:13 1(C)(2), if a dissenting shareholder does not file a demand in
writing with the corporation for the fair cash value of his shares
within twenty days of the mailing of the notice of merger, then the
appraisal remedy is lost. 126 In Yuspeh, this twenty day period
probably passed by the time the minority shareholders decided to
bring suit. By allowing the plaintiffs to pursue a distinct fiduciary
duty claim, the court provided a means of circumventing this rule.
One could argue that after the Yuspeh decision, Louisiana courts
believe that the dissenters' rights are exclusive, yet they will
nonetheless allow exceptions in instances of fraud and a breach of
fiduciary duty by the majority shareholders. If this is true, it would
push Louisiana closer to the ALI and R.M.B.C.A. rule of making
dissenters' rights exclusive unless there is a compelling reason to not
make the rights exclusive. 127 The Yuspeh court should be
commended for following the lead of several other states and not
solely delegating dissenting shareholders to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 12:131 in cases of fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty. The
previously outlined problems with dissenters' rights undoubtedly
influenced the decision.
However, one must remember that allowing non-exclusivity does
not come without costs. Allowing shareholders to pursue other
claims, including breach of fiduciary duty and fraud, will increase
litigation costs and exposure for corporations. Nevertheless, while
keeping these costs low was part of the compromise between the
majority and minority shareholders when the dissenters' rights were
originally written, it is only fair that corporations accept these costs.
124. Levy, 443 So. 2d at 544-45.
125. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 47,
writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).

126.

See supratext accompanying notes 67-74, for discussion ofthe procedural

requirements of La. R.S. 12:131.

127. See supra text accompanying note 96 for the ALI rule. See supra text
accompanying note 97 for the R.M.B.C.A. rule.
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These costs only develop because ofthe possibility that the majority
shareholders are reaping too much power when they oust minority
shareholders out of the surviving corporation in a freeze-out
transaction.
IV. THE LOUISIANA FIFTH CIRUIT COURT OF APPEAL'S
DETERMINATION OF THE STOCK'S VALUE

After the court in Yuspeh decided to not exclusively limit the
shareholders to dissenters' rights, the court then ruled that the
minority shareholders' stock should be valued with no discount.128
This was a break from prior jurisprudence, but was definitely the
correct decision.'29 The court could have been much more
pronounced in this decision, but most likely did not cite applicable
prior jurisprudence in its discussion because it did not want to follow
such precedent.
In 1989, in Shopfv. MarinaDel Ray Partnership,the Louisiana
Supreme Court ruled that a minority interest discount would be
applied to an exiting partner.'3 ° In Shopf, a partner sought a
determination of the sum due to him for his proportionate share in the
partnership. The Court looked to the price paid to a different
terminating partner just three months earlier to help determine what
sum the exiting partner should be paid. However, the Court's
analysis cannot strictly be viewed as looking to only arms-lengths
transactions in order to determine a value for the exiting partner's
interest. This is because the Court ultimately concluded that a
minority interest discount should be applied to the former arms-length
transaction and rendered ajudgment for the partner in that amount.131
The Court, in its reasons for judgment, stated:
The determination of the value of a fractional share in a
business entity involves more than fixing the value of the
business and multiplying by the fraction being evaluated,
especially when the share is a minority interest. A minority
interest may be uniquely valuable to an owner, but may have
considerably less value to an independent third party because
the interest is relatively illiquid and difficult to market.'32
Another case, which when combined with Shopf v. MarinaDel
Ray, that seemed to possibly be establishing jurisprudence
128. Yuspeh, 840 So. 2d at 51-54.
129. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of why marketability and minority
discounts are improper in "freeze-out" transactions of closely-held corporations.
130. 549 So. 2d 833, 840 (La. 1989).
131. Id. at 840.
132. Id.
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constante'33 for applying the discounts on an exiting member of a
business entity was McMillan v. Bank of the South.' In McMillan,
a bank sought to reorganize and offered to buy the plaintiffs' stock for
a certain price. The plaintiffs declined the offer and sought to enforce
their rights under Louisiana Revised Statutes 6.376."' The court
concluded that it would ascertain the stock's fair cash value by
eliciting expert testimony. This standard for determining fair cash
value is identical to the determination under appraisal rights discussed
earlier. The experts' testimony of the value of the shares had a ten
percent discount for size and thirty-five percent discount for lack of
marketability. In other words, while the Louisiana courts never had
evaluated fair cash value for a dissenting corporate shareholder or a
shareholder asserting a breach of fiduciary duty, as in Yuspeh, it
that it would still use minority and marketability
indicated 36
discounts. 1
However, in 1998, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court ofAppeal
decided Scurria v. Hodge.137 In Scurria,the court did not apply a
discount to the valuation of shares when the continuing corporation
purchased the deceased one-third shareholder's stock from his
successor.138 The court did not discuss the discounting issue or state
that it was overruling any of the prior jurisprudence that favored
However, Scurria is
minority and marketability discounts.
distinguishable because it involved a whole company sale of the
corporation pending at the time that the corporate stock interests of
the successor were valued. The successor of Scurria's stock, a
one-third interest ofthe corporation, was purchased forj ust $100,000
in September of 1984.139 In May of 1985, the whole corporation was
sold for $1,900,000.140 After subtracting debt, the net value of the

133. A civil law term defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: "The doctrine that
a court should give great weight to a rule of law that is accepted and applied in a
long line ofcases, and should not overrule or modify its own decisions unless clear
error is shown and injustice will arise from continuation ofa particular rule oflaw."
Black's Law Dictionary 859 (7th ed. 1999).
134. 514 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied,516 So. 2d 131 (La.
1987).
135. Louisiana Revised Statutes 6:376 is essentially identical to the dissenters'
rights provision which allocates fair cash value to a dissenting shareholder.
136. See, e.g., Shopfv. Marina Del Ray P'ship, 549 So. 2d 833 (La. 1989);
McMillan, 514 So. 2d 227.
137. 31-207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998), 720 So. 2d 460, writ denied, 739 So. 2d
782 (La. 1999).
138. Id. at 467 ("We have utilized the full market value of the corporation for
the determination of the value of the succession's minority share position.").
139. Id. at 462.
140. Id. at 467.
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corporation was $1,550,000.141 The court ruled that the succession
was owed $516,667, which is one-third of the $1,550,000 net value
of the corporation.1 42 In Scurria, it seems that the court was able to
bypass applying any discount because it was able to view the stock
being purchased from the succession as a portion of the total sale
price of the corporation. 14 3 If the court had not looked to the
proportionate share to determine the minority interests' value, then
the inequities ofthe minority discounts would have become evident.
Nevertheless, just because the inequities in a discounting system
are more readily apparent in some cases than others does not mean
that the evils ofdiscounting, previously discussed, are any less likely
to occur.'" It is illogical that the discounting cases have viewed the
minority shareholder's stock being sold as just the stock itself, while
in other cases the court has viewed the stock as a proportionate part
of the company's worth when sold to an outside buyer. 145 Obviously,
the court's view of the minority shareholder's stock as proportionate
part of the company will give the shareholders more cash for their
ownership interests because there would be no discounts applied.
Thus, the proportionate share interest of the company should be
applied even in situations in which there is no pending sale of the
whole company. This was precisely the approach taken by the court
in Yuspeh.
Yuspeh did not mention any of these prior cases, but began its
valuation analysis by stating, "Although we have determined that
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131 is not a dissenting shareholder's
exclusive remedy, we look to the statute for guidance in establishing
the value of a dissenter's stock."' 4 6 The court then proceeded to
determine what the plaintiffs should receive for their stock based on
the fair cash value of Louisiana Revised Statues 12:131.14' Though
the court did mention the proposed purchase by the Kochs of
Murphy's stock for almost $2,000 per share only months before the
purchase of the unissued thirty-four shares of stock for $50 per share
in its breach of fiduciary duty analysis, 4 ' it did not discuss this
transaction in its valuation of the plaintiffs' stock.
However, the court did determine the fair cash value of the
plaintiffs' stock by simply dividing the net value of the company by
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. See also Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 28-29 (Supp. 2003).
144. See Holmes & Morris, supranote 2, at 28-29 (Supp. 2003).
145. Id.
146. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 47,
writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
147. Id. at 51-52.
148. Id.at 50.
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the plaintiffs' proportionate percentage interest in the company.149
Net value of the company was assessed as recurring monthly
revenues (RMR) times a multiplier of forty-five."' 0 Here, the court
in Yuspeh has taken the Scurria decision one step further. In
Scurria, there was a whole company sale closely following the
company's purchase of the succession's minority stock.'
Therefore, it was easy for the court to determine the proportionate
part of the interests of the minority shareholders to the company as
a whole. However, in Yuspeh, there was no whole company sale
that was pending, and so it was more difficult to determine the
minority shareholders proportionate part of CSS. Nevertheless, the
judges used expert testimony to determine the net value of the
company as $783,300 and then divided each plaintiff's interests by
their proportionate share, which awarded each plaintiff $3,840 per
share. 52
' This excellent analysis by the court in Yuspeh allowed the
minority shareholders to avoid the inequities of the minority and
marketability discounts. Awarding $3,840 per share was fair
because the court calculated this amount by using the most
consistent recurring monthly revenues (RMR) and multipliers
recited by the expert witnesses.
While the court's determination of the value of the minority
shareholder's interests was correct, their complete avoidance ofthe
ShopfLouisiana Supreme Court decision is questionable. The court
in Yuspeh simply avoided the minority interest discounts that were
used by the court in Shopf,by distinguishing the sale of the minority
shareholders' interests as a "proportionate share" sale ofthe whole
company.
There are two differences in the Shopfand Yuspeh cases. First,
the Shopf decision dealt with a sale of partnership interests while
Yuspeh dealt with a sale of corporate interests. However, this
distinction is not relevant because the case for discounting would be
weaker, not stronger, in the partnership setting. Second, in Yuspeh
the whole value of CSS was easier to determine than the whole
value of the partnership in Shopf This second reason could be the
distinguishing factor between when discounts should, or should not,
apply to minority interests. However, this is unclear, because the
court did not explicitly address the distinctions.
149. Id. at 52.
150. See supranote 40. As previously noted, these numbers were simply what
the court deemed to be the most consistent evidence from the expert testimonials.
151. Scurria v. Hodge, 31-207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1998), 720 So. 2d 460, writ
denied, 739 So. 2d 782 (La. 1999).
152. See supraPart I.C.3.
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The court in Yuspeh assumed that proportionate interests were
the proper way to value the corporation." 53 The court likely made
this assumption so that they did not have to follow the precedent set
in Shopf Once again, this was the best valuation for the court to
choose, but the fact that Shopfis still valid leaves the jurisprudence
muddled. After Yuspeh, it is still unclear which valuation,
proportionate part or discounting, a court should use if the
corporation's value was not as easy to determine as in Yuspeh or
Scurria. Therefore, in light of the previously outlined accuracy of
the valuation method used in Yuspeh, the Shopf case is ripe to be
overruled.
V. IMPROVING DISSENTERS' RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA BY FOLLOWING
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

This section of the casenote is dedicated to uncovering how the
dissenters' rights statute in Louisiana can be improved to account for
the new problems that were created by freeze-out mergers. The court
in Yuspeh declared that dissenters' rights will not be an exclusive
remedy to dissenting shareholders who possess breach of fiduciary
duty and fraud claims. 5 ' While Yuspeh was only a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeal case, it is possible that Louisiana courts may
continue to decide that, like Delaware,"' it will allow a judicial
exception to the exclusivity of dissenters' rights. However, the
Louisiana legislature should amend its dissenters' rights statute to
provide more clarity for these, and other circumstances, in which the
statutory remedy does not provide for a clear result. Without this
clarity, there is still room for lower courts to distinguish cases on
factual issues and reach incongruous results. Allowing the current
statute to prevail would ultimately result in increased appeals in our
already litigious society. These following paragraphs offer three
suggestions for improving the current dissenters' rights statute in
Louisiana by following the current framework ofthe American Law
Institute.
One way to improve Louisiana's dissenters' rights statute is to
simplify some of the cumbersome procedures which can cause a

153.

Yuspeh, 840 So. 2d 41, 53-54.

154. Id. at 47.
155. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
Delaware's exception to exclusivity is narrower than the exception declared in
Yuspeh. After Rabkin, only fair dealing may be challenged outside an appraisal
proceeding. The decision in Yuspeh simply declares that dissenters' rights are not
exclusive when there is a breach offiduciary duty or fraud imposed on the minority
shareholders.
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dissenting shareholder to lose his appraisal remedy altogether.' 56 The
ALI accomplishes this task. The first procedure under the ALI is that
the corporation must notify each shareholder ofthe right to exercise
the appraisal remedy before the date on which the transaction is to be
voted upon by the shareholders.157 Second, the shareholder shall have
a "reasonable time" in which to elect to dissent from the time the
notice is sent by the corporation in step one. 158 Third, the corporation
should pay to each dissenting shareholder the amount it reasonably
determines to be the fair value of the shares plus any interest due.'
If the dissenting shareholder believes that he did not receive fair value
for his shares then he can petition to the court to have the corporation
pay all costs and expenses of the appraisal proceeding, 16 and he can
also obtain injunctive relief.161 All in all, the ALL approach simply
relaxes the required procedures for a shareholder to assert his
dissenters' rights, and helps to ensure that dissenters receive an
equitable remedy.'62 Louisiana should follow the ALI's guidance in
this area and amend its current dissenters' rights statute accordingly.
Another way to improve Louisiana's dissenters' rights statute is
to liberalize the valuation procedures so that discounts are not
unnecessarily imposed. The ALl achieves this by partitioning all
corporations based on each shareholder's proportionate share as the
court did in Yuspeh. 163 The ALL emphasizes that no discount should
be imposed on the valuation of the stock because of minority status
or, unless there are unusual circumstances, because of a lack of
marketability.'64 In closely-held corporations, like CSS in Yuspeh v.
Koch, this proposal results in discounts virtually never being applied
to the minority shareholders' stock. While the court in Yuspeh
correctly declined to apply any discounts to the shareholders' stock,
156.

See supra Part II.A.

157. American Law Institute, supra note 10, at 335.
158. Id. But see R.M.B.C.A., supranote 95, at § 13.22(b)(2)(ii). A dissenting
shareholder has a maximum of sixty days to respond to the appraisal notice and
form or he is presumed to have acquiesced in the transaction. However, sixty days
would most likely be viewed by most courts as a "reasonable time" period to
respond. Id.
159. American Law Institute, supra note 10, at 336.
160. Id. But see R.M.B.C.A.. supranote 95, at § 13.26. A shareholder who is
dissatisfied with payment must notify the corporation ofthe amount the shareholder
deems due within thirty days, or that shareholder waives the right to demand further
payment. Id.
161. American Law Institute, supra note 10, at 342.
162. See, e.g., id. at 338 ("[T]he shareholder is not required both to elect before
the vote and then to make a further demand after the vote or forfeit eligibility.").
163. Id. at 349.
164.

Id. See also R.M.B.C.A. supranote 95, at § 13.01(4)(iii). No discounting

for lack of marketability or minority status is allowed. Id.
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it would provide much needed clarity to specify in Louisiana's current
dissenters' rights statute that these discounts will not be allowed.
Finally, Louisiana could improve its appraisal remedy statute by
stating whether or not it is a dissenting shareholder's exclusive
remedy. Once again, following the ALI's guidance on this issue
65
would help to improve the dissenters' rights statute in Louisiana.1
The ALl attempts to make the dissenters' rights the exclusive remedy,
while still allowing for limited exceptions. 166 Essentially, the ALl
makes the dissenters' rights exclusive in publicly traded corporations
or where there is no conflict of interest of a controlling shareholder
or executive.1 67 In a closely-held corporation, like CSS in Yuspeh, if
a controlling shareholder does not fulfill his obligation offair dealing
then the dissenters' rights will not be exclusive. 168 The burden of
proof is on the controlling shareholders in a freeze-out merger to
prove that the transaction is fair to the minority shareholders. If
adopted, the ALl rule would actually be an improvement over the
decision declared in Yuspeh because in Yuspeh, the court did not shift
the burden of proof to the controlling shareholders. In Yuspeh, the
court essentially requires the minority shareholders to display why
they were not treated fairly.
Also in dealing with exclusivity, the ALl focuses on whether full
disclosure is made to the shareholders when soliciting their approval
of corporate transactions and whether the transactions were approved
in accordance with applicable laws. 169 In fact, the ALI states,
"[b]ecause it is shareholder approval of the combination that serves
to relegate the shareholders to an appraisal remedy, the exceptions to
exclusivity should focus on the quality of the process by which
shareholder approval was obtained."' 7 ° This approach is preferable
over simple exceptions to exclusivity for fraud or unlawful conduct
165. American Law Institute, supranote 10, at 335-37. This simplification of
the complicated procedural rules includes extending the time period that the
minority shareholder possesses to assert the statutory remedy of twenty days to a
"reasonable period." Id
166. Id.at 295.
167. See id.
168. See id at 347-48. "The availability of an appraisal remedy does not
preclude a proceeding against a director, officer, controlling shareholder, or an
associate of any of the foregoing, for a violation of Part V, Duty of Fair Dealing."
Id.at 348.

169. Id. at 349.
170. Id. But see R.M.B.C.A., supra note 95, at § 13.02(d) (permitting
exceptions to exclusivity for fraud, material representations, or when a corporate
transaction was not completed in accordance with applicable law). The ALI's
approach does not simply focus on the vague term fraud, but instead focuses on
whether full disclosure has been made to the shareholders. American Law Institute,
supra note 10, at 349.
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because those terms are too vague and subject to various judicial
interpretations.'71
Ideally, it would be best to improve the statutory remedy in such
a way that the rights could be made completely exclusive. However,
because ofthe possible conflicts ofinterest in freeze-out transactions,
some exceptions to a strict application of exclusivity need to be
maintained in the statute. Still, this proposed statutory amendment
will solve many ofthe problems that freeze-out mergers have caused
to occur. To summarize, the present law of dissenters' rights in
Louisiana is not treating all minority shareholders fairly. If Louisiana
amended its dissenters' rights to more closely follow the ALI's
approach in dealing with procedures, share valuation, and exclusivity
it would move Louisiana closer towards fixing the problems presently
existing with dissenters' rights.
CONCLUSION

Across the nation dissenters' rights statutes are being used for
purposes for which the statutes were not initially designed to
accomplish.'72 As a result, courts should not rule that dissenters'
rights are the sole remedy available to a minority shareholder who has
dissented from a freeze-out transaction. In Yuspeh v. Koch, the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal made an excellent decision
when it explicitly declared that appraisal rights are not an exclusive
Louisiana has essentially
remedy to a dissenting shareholder.'
followed Delaware's approach to exclusivity by providing precedent
through which a dissenting shareholder may circumvent their
appraisal remedy in search of other causes of action.
The court in Yuspeh should also be commended for estimating the
fair cash value ofthe minority shareholder's stock as a proportionate
part of the corporation as a whole.
Applying minority or
be
reasonable
if the minority
marketability discounts would
shareholders were selling their stock to third parties. However, as
between the controlling and minority shareholders in a freeze-out
transaction, there is no reason to penalize the minority shareholders
for lack of control by applying discounts to their stock. This part of
the decision is accurate, although the court's mere avoidance of the
74 is questionable. The court in
Shopfv. MarinaDel Ray Partnership'
Yuspeh simply bypassed the Shopf precedent by assuming that the
171. See, e.g., R.M.B.C.A., supranote 95, § 13.02(b) (allowing exceptions to
exclusivity based on fraud or unlawful conduct.).
172. Thompson, supranote 4, at 4.
173. Yuspeh v. Koch, 2002-698 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2003), 840 So. 2d 41, 47,
writ denied, 847 So. 2d 1277 (La. 2003).
174. 549 So. 2d 833 (La. 1989).
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minority shareholders' stock should be valued as a proportionate part
of the' corporation as a whole. While this was the correct valuation
of the stock for reasons previously discussed, it is unclear whether
future decisions will follow Yuspeh's assumption, or alternatively,
will follow the Shopfprecedent ofapplying discounts to the minority
shareholders' stock.
The decision in Yuspeh shows that Louisiana is already in
agreement with many ofthe promulgated rules suggested by the ALI.
Louisiana should continue to follow the ALI's guidance and amend
its current dissenters' rights statute to ease the cumbersome
procedural rules, to dictate that discounts should not apply to minority
stock in a closely-held corporation, and to be able to explicity require
the application of the remedy exclusively with limited exceptions.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131 is problematic in its current form,
and the Louisiana legislature needs to amend the statute to fully
address the troubles that freeze-out mergers cause to minority
shareholders.
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